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Abstract: Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) is a major problem in the poultry industry.
It is highly contagious and is associated with a high mortality rate. The Philippines experienced an
outbreak of avian influenza (AI) in 2017. As there is always a risk of re-emergence, e↵orts to manage
disease outbreaks should be optimal. Linked to this is the need for an e↵ective surveillance procedure
to capture disease outbreaks at their early stage. Risk-based surveillance is the most e↵ective and
economical approach to outbreak management. This study evaluated the potential of commercial
poultry farms in Central Luzon to transmit HPAI by calculating their respective reproductive ratios
(R0). The reproductive number for each farm is based on the spatial kernel and the infectious period.
A risk map has been created based on the calculated R0. There were 882 (76.63%) farms with R0 < 1.
Farms with R0   1 were all located in Pampanga Province. These farms were concentrated in the
towns of San Luis (n = 12) and Candaba (n = 257). This study demonstrates the utility of mapping
farm-level R0 estimates for informing HPAI risk management activities.
Keywords: risk maps; transmission kernel; active surveillance; highly pathogenic avian influenza;
Philippines
1. Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) has caused disease outbreaks among domestic
poultry and wild bird populations, resulting in significant economic losses in many countries around
the world. The potential of the infection to cause illnesses in humans is also a major concern.
The Philippines confirmed an outbreak of HPAI H5N6 subtype, based on follow-up tests done in an
Australian laboratory in August of 2017. Commercial poultry farms in barangays San Carlos and
Santa Rita of San Luis, Pampanga were a↵ected. After a week, cases were confirmed in Nueva Ecija,
a province adjacent to Pampanga. A second wave of the outbreak was reported on 12 November
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2017 in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. A total of 23 farms were identified to have bird flu infection in the
two provinces from July to November 2017. Sixteen farms were in Pampanga and seven in Nueva
Ecija. Eight towns in Pampanga were a↵ected (Apalit, Bacolor, Candaba, Lubao, Mabalacat, San Luis,
San Simon, SantoTomas) and four towns in Nueva Ecija were included (Cabiao, Jaen, San Isidro,
Zaragosa). During the outbreak, 15 layer chicken farms, 6 duck farms, and 2 quail farms were infected.
An outbreak investigation identified key factors a↵ecting the spread of the disease among farms
including low biosecurity, having multiple species reared on the farm, no outbreak monitoring system,
inability to identify the disease, and uncontrolled trade in poultry commodities. Therewere 45,682 birds
that had died from the disease, while 393,515 birds were killed during the implementation of relevant
outbreak management programs. The estimated daily loss as a consequence of the epidemic was about
US$3.6 million [1]. Although increased mortality figures among poultry could not be definitively
attributed to HPAI, there were accounts that many birds had died from symptoms consistent with
HPAI several months prior to the confirmation of the outbreak.
Given the widespread under-reporting of this epidemic that has been associated with inadequate
compensation and fear of trade restrictions, passive surveillancemeasureswill be of limited e↵ectiveness.
E↵ective surveillance protocols enable authorities to detect disease outbreaks at an early stage, which
should then trigger an immediate control response. As a result, the a↵ected livestock industry will
be prevented from incurring severe economic losses. While this may be the ideal situation, in most
countries around the world the government’s veterinary service may not be able to cope with the
necessary surveillance demands. This is due to the need for the simultaneous monitoring of many
di↵erent diseases among various species and the need for a single agency to cover a large territory.
Consequently, present surveillance strategies mainly rely on reporting by livestock keepers.
Implementationof an e↵ective active surveillanceprotocol requires increasedveterinarymanpower,
but most municipalities and cities are not prepared to invest in strengthening the capacity of their
veterinary services. A more cost-e↵ective alternative to active surveillance is a risk-based surveillance
approach. By focusing on the high-risk strata of the population at risk, it is possible to conserve valuable
resources. The identification of high-risk strata requires a good understanding of the epidemiological
and socio-economic drivers of the spread of the relevant infectious disease. Risk factor studies have
been used to identify spatial drivers of infection risk, and these have been used to generate risk
maps [2–5]. Such outputs can be used to identify geographical areas where surveillance e↵orts should
be implemented. Furthermore, several authors have described the successful use of a transmission
kernel method for generating risk maps [6–14]. In brief, a transmission kernel represents the relative
risk of transmission in terms of the distance to an infected farm. It is used as a proxy for all potential
routes of infection that are spread between farms [7,12,15,16]. The method allows for the calculation of
farm-level basic reproductive ratio values (R0). The R0 is the expected number of secondary infections
that occur among susceptible farms, as well as those that are caused by the first infectious farm
throughout the initial infectious period [8,17]. A farm has the potential to cause an epidemic if its
R0 > 1, while it cannot if its R0 < 1 [14]. The identification of farms that can serve as sources of
epidemics can be set as the focus of the surveillance initiatives.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza is included in the priority list of diseases being monitored
by the Philippine government. Therefore, this study evaluated the potential of commercial poultry
farms in Central Luzon for transmitting HPAI by calculating their basic reproductive ratio numbers.
This information was then used to produce a risk map based on the calculated R0.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Study Area
The study was conducted in Central Luzon, Philippines. The Central Luzon region is composed
of 7 provinces including Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales
(Figure 1). According to the data of the Philippine Statistics Authority, Central Luzon is the region with
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the highest density of ducks (32%) as of January 1, 2019 [18]. Moreover, the region is home to 68.8% of
the total ducks kept in commercial farms. Likewise, the region is also home to the highest number of
chickens with a 35.9% share of the country’s total chicken population over the same period of time [19].
A commercial farm is defined as a poultry operation with a minimum of 500 layers or 1000 broilers.
For combined operation, a farm with at least 100 layers and 100 broilers is considered commercial.
Figure 1. Map of the Philippines showing the study provinces.
2.2. Data Sources
HPAI outbreak data were provided by the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Philippines.
The poultry farms included in this study were based on the registration records for commercial
poultry operations of the Provincial Veterinary O ces (PVO). The farm profiles (poultry population by
species, farm coordinates) were compiled from farm visits that had been conducted throughout the
region. Each farm’s maximum poultry capacity, and not the actual bird population at the time of the
visits, were used in the analysis.
2.3. Model Formulation
The calculation of the farm level reproductive number (R0) as described by Boender et al. [6,11]
requires the computation of the transmission kernel (h) and the stochastic infectious period (T).
The transmission kernel (h) was used to represent all forms of disease transmission between susceptible
farms [15]. This parameter has been used to HPAI [7,20–22] and other infectious animal disease models
like foot and mouth disease [15,23,24]. It refers to the infection hazard posed by an infectious animal
from an infected farm to a susceptible animal of a susceptible farm. It is a function of the Euclidean
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distance (r) between farms. We adopted the kernel formulation (Equation (1)) from the studies of
Boender et al. [6,11] and Dorigatti et al. [22]:
h
⇣
rij
⌘
=
h0⇣
1+
⇣
rij/r0
⌘↵⌘ (1)
The rij refers to the Euclidean distance between an infectious farm j and a susceptible farm i.
The h0 is the maximum hazard rate, occurring when r0= 0. The r0 influences how far the hazard
rate extends over distance. The ↵ parameter influences the rate of decay in the hazard rate from the
maximum. A dataset for the pairwise Euclidean distances (r) between farms was created. The distance
between farms was calculated using the distGeo function of the geosphere in R statistical software
version 3.5.3 (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria) [25].
To calculate the likelihood function, the force of infection on a susceptible farm i at time t was
given by Equation (2) as described in [6]:
 i(t) =
X
j,i
h(rij) 1 [ j is infectious ] (2)
With  i(t) as the force of infection or the cumulative hazard rate experienced by farm i on day t,
the probability that farm i is infected on day t is:
qi(t) = 1  e  i(t) (3)
The probability that farm i remains uninfected up to day t is:
ri(t) = e 
Xt 1
s=1
 i(s) (4)
Given the risk of infection above, the log-likelihood function is given by:
` =  
X
k✏K
tmax 1X
t=1
 k(t)  
X
l✏L
tcul,l 1X
t=1
 l(t)  
X
m✏M
tin f ,m 1X
t=1
 m(t) +
X
m✏M
log
⇣
1  e  m(tin f ,m)⌘ (5)
where the set K contains all farms that remained uninfected and that were not culled; L contains
the farms that were not infected but that were culled (at times tcul, l);M contains the farms that were
infected (at times tin f , m). With Equation (5), the estimates for the transmission kernel parameter values
(h0, r0, and ↵) were calculated through maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) as described in [6] using
the 2017 Philippines HPAI epidemic data. The bbmle functions of the R program [25] was used for
this procedure.
Following the procedure described by Boender et al. [6], the basic reproduction number was
estimated for each poultry farm in Central Luzon using the spatial transmission kernel ((h(rij)) and the
stochastic infectious period (T) of farms i. The reproduction number of farms i, R0, is given by:
R0 =
X
j,i
(1  E [ e h(ri j)Ti] (6)
The computed R0 after 1000 iterations was used as the reference in developing the risk map.
The doParallel functions of R [25] was used to calculate the reproductive ratio of each farm. Farms with
at least 1.0 R0 were classified as high-risk farms. The risk map was created using QGIS (Open Source
Geospatial Foundation Project, Zurich, Switzerland) [26].
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3. Assumptions
Upon infection, a farm passes through a latency period of 1–2 days [22,27–29]. In this stage,
the avian influenza virus develops within the host until the host becomes infectious by shedding
the virus. Viral inoculation experiments of HPAIV showed that birds can start shedding the virus
after 0.76 day [30], or 1.1 day [31]. Though it is possible that birds can start to become infectious in
less than 24 h after infection, we adopted the results of Vander Goot [32]. Their results showed that
a latent period of 1–2 days fits the data better than the model with a latent period of less than one
day. This is likewise adopted by Boender et al. [6], and Dorigatti et al. [22] in their HPAI simulation
studies. The detection of HPAI in the farm is assumed to be on days 5–7. This is based on mortality
thresholds [33]. Several studies have shown mortality thresholds to be the most reliable indicator of AI
infection in poultry farms [34,35]. The assumptions used here are not specific for the H5N6 subtype.
However, the range of transmission rate of the HPAI H5N6 virus in domestic poultry is close to or
within the range of transmission rates found for other HPAI subtypes. This is generally applicable in
cases where transmission experiments are limited. The infection experiment by Jiao (2016) showed that
inoculated chicken died at 4–7 days post inoculation (dpi) [36]. Chicken succumbed by 4–5 dpi based
on the results of Kim (2018) [37]. We assumed that suspicion of HPAIV infection due to increased
mortalities will happen between 5 and 7 days after infection. Based on the response of farm managers
to a survey, they will be notifying authorities about the presence of the disease 5–7 days post detection.
Using the outbreak data as reference, culling of an infected farm is initiated 1–3 days after receipt of
the report. The days required for completion of culling of infected farms after reporting were 1–3 days,
depending on the size of the farm. Specifically, for farms with a population 50,000, the culling needs
1 day; for farms with 50,000 < population 100,000, the culling needs 2 days; for farms with population
>100,000, the culling needs 3 days. The infectious period lasts until the completion of culling.
4. Results
4.1. Farm Location
The locations of the poultry farms included in this study are shown in Figure 2. There was a total
of 1151 poultry farms that kept chickens (n = 880), ducks (n = 260), or quail (n = 11). The duck farms
identified in the study were all located in Pampanga Province. The poultry farm distribution data in
the study area, and their average flock size are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Distribution of poultry farms in the provinces of Central Luzon.
Province Poultry Farms Average Population
Aurora 9 8222
Bataan 90 54,147
Bulacan 154 92,858
Nueva Ecija 268 57,823
Pampanga 485 27,257
Tarlac 112 87,231
Zambales 33 104,164
Poultry production levels are considered high in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
and Bulacan. These provinces represent 78.8% of the total poultry farms in the region. Likewise,
they share 70.3% of the total poultry population. Large scale operations were observed in the provinces
of Bulacan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Zambales considering their high average flock sizes. In contrast,
Pampanga was able to significantly contribute to the regional poultry production levels because of the
high number of poultry farms (n = 485) despite its lower average flock size. Aurora had the smallest
number of farms. This may be due to the logistical challenges of poultry farming that exist in the area.
This would likely be a consequence of its remoteness and it being in a mountainous area.
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Figure 2. Map of Central Luzon, Philippines showing the physical location of all 1151 commercial
poultry farms. Chicken farms are represented by blue dots. Quail farms are represented by green
squares. Duck farms are represented by red triangles.
4.2. Farm Practices
At this study site, ducks were raised mainly for the purposes of egg production. Incorporated into
the management protocol of duck farms is the concept of foraging. This provides ducks the opportunity
to consume snails which are believed to improve the shell quality of the eggs produced by these ducks.
Foraging sites include swamps and empty rice paddies. This practice requires frequent movement of
the flock in search of foraging areas. Ducks were moved via trucks with customized battery cages.
Foraging in a particular geographical area may range from 3 to 7 days before the ducks are moved to a
di↵erent area. Fresh and processed eggs were then sold to traders or directly to consumers through
bakeries and restaurants.
In contrast, chickens are always kept within the boundaries of the farm. Chicken raising operations
can be dedicated either to layer or broiler chickens. At the end of a production cycle, poultry manure
can be sold to vegetable farms as fertilizer. Broilers were either bought by traders or by the company
partner if the operation was under contract. For the layers, the spent hens were sold to poultry traders.
4.3. Transmission Parameters
Maximum likelihood estimation based on the 23 infected farms during the 2017 HPAI outbreak
resulted in the following parameter estimates: h0 = 0.0012 day 1 (CI: 0.0001–0.1), r0 = 3.4 km
(CI: 1.001–10.0), and ↵ = 1.4 (CI: 1.001–5.0), with ` =  206.99 and AIC = 419.98.
4.4. Farm-Level Basic Reproductive Ratio Values
The summary statistics for the farm-level farm reproductive ratio are presented in Table 2.
The median of the farm-level basic reproductive ratio values for the 1151 commercial farms in Central
Luzon was 0.424. There were 882 (76.63%) farms with a R0 of less than 1. Chickens are the predominant
species (96.2%, 849/882) raised in these farms. Meanwhile, ducks are the major species (86.98%, 234/269)
in farms with a R0   1.
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Table 2. Summary of farm-level basic reproductive ratio values.
R0 Ducks Quail Chickens Total
0.01–0.50 8 6 705 719
0.51–0.99 18 1 144 163
1.00–1.50 8 3 12 23
1.51–2.00 135 0 15 150
2.01–2.5 91 1 4 96
Notably, around 77% (882/1151) of the total poultry farms in Central Luzon are outside the
high-risk areas. These farms include 26 duck farms, 7 quail farms, and 849 chicken farms (Figure 3).
All farms with a R0   1 are located in Pampanga Province. These farms are concentrated in the towns
of San Luis (n = 12) and Candaba (n = 257). This area is composed of 234 duck farms, 31 chicken farms,
and 4 quail farms.
 
Figure 3. Risk map of highly pathogenic avian influenza transmission in Central Luzon, Philippines.
5. Discussion
In this study, farm-level basic reproductive ratio values were calculated and used to generate a
risk map for the transmission of HPAI in Central Luzon. The transmission kernel was derived from
the profiles of the 23 farms infected during the 2017 HPAI epidemic in the Philippines. These farms
were identified through reports from farm owners to the BAI. It is acknowledged that the results from
this modeling exercise need to be used cautiously, since only this single outbreak could be used for
generating the transmission kernel and there may have been underreporting of farm locations and
disease events. The findings are discussed below in the context of the wider literature to allow an
assessment of their epidemiological validity.
To construct the model, the factors used to account for the species-specific transmissibility
were developed by Hayama [8], Keeling [10], and Dorigatti [22]. The number of animals in the
farm is likewise added to the equation used by Keeling [10] and Hayama [23]. The inclusion of a
species-specific transmission coe cient is considered important if there are variations in susceptibility
and the occurrence of infections among di↵erent species, such as is the case with avian influenza.
Unfortunately, no further parameters could be derived from this small dataset. The approach used here
has also been applied in order to generate risk maps for FMD [11] and HPAI [6] in the Netherlands.
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Moreover, with the available dataset, kernel density estimation may be the best approach. Other
spatial techniques include the cluster detection method, the relative space method, and risk factor
identification [38]. The research studies of Ahmed et al. [39], Loth et al. [2], and Tiensin et al. [40]
likewise were aimed at identifying high-risk areas for the spread of HPAI. Both Ahmed and Loth used
data acquired from the Bangladesh outbreaks, while Tiensin et al. [40] used data obtained from the
Thailand outbreaks. Bangladesh had two epidemic waves of HPAI in two consecutive years, while
Thailand generated outbreak data from 2004 to 2007. In these cases, the availability of large and
more detailed datasets allowed for the application of the spatial cluster detection method and risk
factor identification.
The calculated R0 can be used to inform risk-based surveillance. Currently, the Philippines does
not have laws providing veterinary authorities with the legal powers to investigate the health status of
animal farms in the absence of a disease outbreak. But if high risk farms can be identified based on
scientific criteria, such as the R0, it might be possible to convince farmers of the need for risk-based
surveillance protocols. Large poultry industry companies could use the spatial patterns of R0 to
identify low-risk geographical areas to target in their production expansion initiatives.
The results indicate that duck farms represent the majority (87%) of farms with an R0   1 (Table 2).
Wild and domestic ducks have been associated with the spread and maintenance of avian influenza
viruses (AIV) [40–42]. Free grazing ducks played a significant role in the maintenance and transmission
of infections during the second wave of HPAI epidemic of Thailand in 2004 [43] The AIV of the
H5N6, H5N2, and H9N3 subtypes were isolated from healthy ducks for sale in live markets in Hanoi,
Vietnam [44]. The study of Sturm-Ramirez et al. (2005) showed that the HPAI H5N1 virus causes
minimal signs of diseases in ducks. Consequently, they can spread HPAI silently and e ciently among
domestic and wild birds in Asia [45].
Part of the production management procedure for duck farmers involves grazing in post-harvest
rice paddy fields, and thereby, requires frequent movement between habitat sites which the ducks share
with other wild birds. Analysis of the HPAI-H5N1 epidemic in Thailand revealed that outbreaks are
commonly reported in the central and northern regions where duck population densities are high [46].
Similarly, low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) subtypes H4N6 and H3N8 were isolated from sentinel
flocks of ducks in Thailand several years after the epidemic [47]. The 2017 HPAI H5N6 outbreak in the
Philippines confirmed that HPAI is virulent among domestic ducks. This was also observed among
H5N1 infected ducks in 2002. The virus killed many aquatic bird species. Earlier, ducks infected with
highly pathogenic H5 or H7 avian influenza virus are consistently asymptomatic or had very mild
disease. The outbreaks in Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan from 2002 to 2004 were pathogenic to ducks.
Hulse-Post et al. [48] reported that there is a possibility for AIV to revert to its non-pathogenic form
among the duck population. Their study showed a trend toward decreased pathogenicity among
ducks. The virus remained highly pathogenic to chickens and humans. This finding demonstrates the
limitation of using only clinical signs to determine infection with HPAI among the duck population.
Consequently, the reliance on passive surveillance will not be e↵ective. Thus, regular monitoring
through testing among the duck population should be included in the strategy against HPAIV.
The vast majority of farms with R0   1 were located in Candaba, Pampanga (95.5%, n = 257).
The Candaba swamp that is in this town is a recognized stopover for migratory birds from the Northern
Hemisphere, especially for birds from China and Russia. During the dry season, part of the swamp
is utilized for rice production [49]. Epidemiological studies of HPAI outbreaks have identified the
relevance of the proximity to natural wetlands and water bodies as an important risk factor [50–53].
These areas provide an interface for contact between domestic and wild ducks.
The identification of the risk factors associated with the spread of HPAI is outside the objectives
of this study. The spatial risks presented above are brought out as the observed features of the farms
that are at high risk for outbreaks (high farm density, high duck farm density, and proximity to the
Candaba swamp). The risks that were identified agree with the findings of prior studies. Programs to
address these spatial risks should be integrated into the plans being put into place to address the avian
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influenza concern. The potential indirect contact between domestic ducks and infected migratory birds
through sharing the same foraging areas cannot be avoided. Feeding in post-harvest rice paddy fields is
integral to the production system of duck farms. Surveillance e↵orts should be comprehensive among
the duck population, and both low and highly pathogenic AIV should be covered. To supplement
active surveillance practices, sentinel flocks can be set up to monitor the presence of AIV.
The risk of spread is more likely to be observed in areas with high levels of farm density.
The a↵ected area in the 2010 FMD epidemic in Japan was the Miyazaki Prefecture. This prefecture is
home to the highest density of cattle farms (165.0 farms/100 km2) and the second highest density of
pig farms (9.8 farms/100 km2). Proximity (1.5 km) to an infected farm has been associated with the
spread of HPAI in Italy [53]. The HPAI outbreaks in Thailand occurred in areas with high levels of
poultry farm-density [46].
In part, the density of farms can be regulated through the development of policies that limit the
number of farms allowed in an area. This can be implemented in current low-risk areas. Regulations,
however, can only cover commercial farms as these are required to obtain government permits for
their operation. The establishment of small-scale operations cannot be controlled unless a mandatory
registration of farms with at least 50 birds is implemented. To address the risk of outbreaks spreading
into high-density areas, farms must be required to maintain high levels of biosecurity. There should be
information campaigns on improved biosecurity practices among poultry raisers in both high- and
low-risk areas. Another aspect of the programs to be instituted would include the identification and
description of the trading dynamics that exist between the farms located in high-risk areas and their
customers. This information will facilitate contact-tracing in the event of an outbreak. With the risk
map as a guide, management strategies in the event of an HPAI outbreak are dependent upon the
location of the index farm. Quarantine procedures and the culling of infected farms located outside
high-risk areas would be su cient in controlling the potential spread. In contrast, farms with a high
probability of disease transmission require additional pre-emptive culling to mitigate the possibility
of an outbreak. One limitation of this study is the unknown number of unregistered quail and duck
farms in contrast to poultry farms, which by law have been o cially registered. While 261 duck farms
were registered, we believe that there were other commercial duck farms outside Pampanga. Poultry
farms were identified based on the records of Provincial Veterinary O ces. Apparently, a number of
small-scale duck and quail producers were not compliant in registering their operations. Compared
to the operation of other species, a commercial quail farm does not require much space, and the
transportation of quail eggs to the market can be done in concealed ways such as in vans or in the
boots of cars. Quails are known to be highly susceptible to HPAI, and the clinical disease period can
last longer than in chickens. Thus, quail farms are known to have high potential for transmitting the
disease [54,55]. It is therefore likely that the current map is biased due to missing observations that are
associated with specific farm species that are known to be important risk factors for avian influenza.
Based on the findings from this study, it is recommended to expand the coverage of the risk map
to a national scale. Thus, mandatory registration of all poultry holdings will be required. This will
then potentially allow to identify further high-risk areas where more intensive surveillance should
be implemented. Furthermore, a national database of poultry farm profiles would allow epidemic
modeling projects related to other avian diseases.
6. Conclusions
In conclusion, the HPAI risk map was generated by using the transmission kernel estimated
from the 2017 epidemic data. This method allowed us to identify high-risk areas by calculating the
farm-level basic reproductive ratio. The resulting risk map facilitates visual communication of the
findings to decision-makers, and it thereby serves as an e↵ective tool in support of the development
of HPAI control and prevention strategies for specific geographic areas. Importantly, risk maps are
dynamic, and need to be critically reviewed and updated once new information becomes available.
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Extending the risk mapping process to the national level with inclusion of small-scale poultry farms
(of at least 50 birds) may allow identification of other high-risk areas in the country.
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